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1

A BSTRACT

Malware is an ever-evolving issue in the
world of technology. Just as fast as systems to
detect malware are created, new malware is
designed to bypass it. Therefore, a constantly
learning system must be devised to detect if
an executable is malware. This project covers
an introduction to what malware is, methods
of hiding malware from detection, and the construction of a neural network to determine if a
piece of code is malware or not, given some
pre-specified data points extracted from the
program. This model is then analyzed with a
comparison of false positives and negatives related to the true positives and negatives. Given
the relatively basic construction of the neural
network, with only about 40 lines of code from
the scikit python library, a very high precision rate is achieved, with under 1% of each
false positive and false negative results.

2

I NTRODUCTION

paper will also explain the reasoning behind the
aspects of the neural network, and how the information about the executables are extracted.

3

T YPES

OF

A NALYSIS

Malware Analysis can be split into two major categories: analysis of reverse engineered
source code, and analysis of the binary executable. For the purposes of this project, I
will only be focusing on the analysis of the
binary executable. Furthermore, there are multiple types of executable files. However, for the
purposes of this project, I will primarily be
focusing on the Microsoft Windows Portable
Executable format. See appendix C.2 for a description of the layout of a PE file.
When it comes to analyzing a binary, there
are two primary methods of analysis: static and
dynamic analysis.
3.1

Techniques of Static Malware Analysis

Static Malware Analysis is done by a diMalware is the term referring to software
rect analysis of the .bin or similar file, withthat causes intentional damage to a computer
out running it. For this section, static analysis
system. There are many different types of maltechniques will be run on an executable file
ware, including
ircbot.exe for a so-called ”IRC Chat Bot”
that is actually a keylogger. Some basic static
•
viruses
malware analysis techniques are as follows:
•
spyware
•
worms
•
Using strings command to find the
•
trojans
segments of printable characters
•
rootkits
In an executable file, strings are stored in
Malware can enter a system in an uncounta plain text area of the file. The strings
able number of ways. However, most malware
command looks through the bytes of the
gets installed due to a user clicking on a bad
file, and finds all printable characters in
website, installing a program that isn’t what it
a length of four characters or greater
claims to be, or opening an email that contains
(four characters is by default, but can be
malicious code. In short, the most insecure part
adjusted by a flag). This can sometimes
of an operating system is the user.
give a basic idea of what the program
does. Using the strings command
Although there are a vast number of malon the supplied program ircbot.exe,
ware programs, many of them can be clustered,
some idea of the program can be deterdue to the large amount of code sharing that
mined. See Appendix A for command
goes on in the malware development commuand output.
nity. This paper describes the creation of a
The output of the strings comneural network that will be able to guess with a
mand mostly shows that the IRC bot
relatively high level of precision if a given piece
does some stuff with HTTP connecexecutable is malware or benignware, given a
tions. However, some closer analysis
set of characteristics about the program. This

3

•

•

•

shows output relating to keyloggers.
This means that this program most likely
has a keylogger running in the background of the main program.
Strings dumping is a very basic method
of analysis that is simple to run, but does
not yield a large amount of useful data.
One method malware uses to get around
a strings analysis is to obfuscate the
strings. Even a basic Caeser or Vignere
cypher will obfuscate the strings to the
point of being unreadable. Furthermore,
some programs will download the malicious sections of code from a remote
API on runtime, so the malicious code
is not found via a static string dump.
Therefore, the strings command is a
good first place to start, but will not do
much good after that.
Comparison of hostnames found in the
file
If a piece of malware uses a remotely
downloaded resource, it must contain
the URL in the file. A method of bypassing this is by encoding the hostname,
but if the writer of the malware does not
take care to do this, the hostname can be
found as a printable string in the file.
Shared Image/Resources. Analysis of
the similar shared icons and other
graphical assets can be a good way
of clustering malware. The python tool
wrestool can be used to extract images
from Windows binaries [4].
Shared code analysis (henceforth SCA)
SCA is a method of comparing similar
aspects of malware to each other. For
example, if 2 programs both access the
same IP address in an HTTP call, with a
similar user header, then there is a strong
chance that they share some functionality.
The idea behind SCA is rather simple.
Using network visualization1 , one can
create a graph to see visually what pro-

1. Note that ”network” in this case is used to define the graph
that consists of nodes (malware) and their edges that connect
them (similar code/logic). Network here does not refer to an
internet connection.

•

grams share code and logic with another
program. See Appendix B for a basic
network created from a set of malware
samples.
One of the first steps in analyzing malware via SCA is by determining the ”bag
of features” that the malware contains.
This is a mathematical ”set” of features
(such features may include particular
strings from a string dump, imported
DLL’s, or output in a log from the dynamic running of the malware). More
specifically, however, the important step
is finding similarities in the flow control
of the program. By comparing the ngrams using a Jaccard Index, one can
score the similarity between programs,
and group programs with a high Jaccard
index in groups.
One basic way to score the similarity
between a large number of malware is
by using a similarity matrix to show the
similarity scores between every malware
in the input set.
The amount of shared data must be normalized betweeen comparisons of malware. The technique that will be used
in this case is the Jaccard Index2 . The
Jaccard index ranges from 0 (no selected
elements are shared between programs),
to 1 (all selected elements are shared
between programs).
Decompilation of machine code to assembly language
Machine language consists of the binary
instructions that tell the CPU what to
do. This machine language has a one
to one correspondence with an assembly command. By converting the machine language found in the binary executable to its corresponding assembly
command3 . A series of machine code
instructions such as 32 0C 25 12 00
00 00 is unreadable by humans, but by
converting these hex values to their cor-

of shared features
2. The Jaccard Index is calculated as JI = #total
# of features
3. An explanation of assembly commands is outside of the
scope of this project, as the assumption is made that the reader
has a basic knowledge of assembly for an x86 platform
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•

responding x86 mnemonics, the meaning of the command becomes clear: XOR
CL, [12H]. 4 .
Instruction Sequence Similarity
One of the most obvious ways to compare two binaries is by comparing sequences of x86 assembly instructions. If
two binaries share large sequences of
code, then they are more than likely
very related. This is a relatively simple method, however, it runs into issues with compiler optimization methods. Compilers nowadays can be almost
frustratingly efficient. See appendix C.1
for an example of compiler optimization
and vast differences in output assembly.
With a good understanding of what assembly commands do, one can scrape
together a general idea of what the program does. However, this can be slow
and tedious, and the exact meaning of
the code can be unclear, especially with
intentional obfuscation of code by a malicious writer, or unintentional optimizations done by the compiler.

Several issues that can limit the effects of
static analysis include packing, resource obfuscation, anti-disassembly techniques, and dynamically downloaded data.
•

•

•

Packing is also known as a self extracting
archive attack. If software unpacks itself
on execution, it is not apparent what
the original purpose of the program was
when doing a static analysis.
Resource Obfuscation: One example
of resource obfuscation is the use of
base 64 encoding of strings. For example, if a format string from a
string dump normally shows ”KEYLOGGER: reading input”, a base 64 encoding would read ”S0VZTE9HR0VSOi
ByZWFkaW5nIGlucHV0”. Unless one
specifically knows to attempt to decode
that string, it can easily be passed over.
Anti-disassembly techniques include obfuscation of commands, adding dead

4. This command XOR’s the CL register with the contents of
address 12H.[20]

•

code, and more. They make it much
more difficult to reverse engineer the
machine code to assembly, and the assembly to source code.
Dynamically downloaded data is the use
of a section of code to download the data
from a remote API. When a static analysis of the code is done, no malicious
code will be found. It is not until the
program itself is run that the malicious
code is downloaded and inserted into
the runtime of the program.

These are limits of static analysis, and there
is a different method that must be used to
get around these. This is where the power of
dynamic malware analysis comes into play.
3.2
sis

Techniques of Dynamic Malware Analy-

Why is dynamic analysis important? First
off, dynamic analysis allows a researcher to
understand what a code does by running it, instead of guessing by looking at the executable.
By comparing the actions of different malwares,
they can be grouped into families. This is commonly referred to as a heuristic analysis. For example, when running a malware in a sandbox,
one might find that it modifies the file system,
loads device drivers, or accesses the network
via HTTP requests.
There are many basic online malware identifiers such as malwr. The malwr tool allows a
user to upload a file suspected to be malware,
and see what happens to a virtual sandbox
when the program runs. Furthermore, malwr
will compare the binary executable to other
malwr that has been analyzed, and show similar features. However, these engines typically
use generic terms that give a general idea of
what the code does, but nothing very specific. If
specificity is desired, one must look at a shared
code analysis program.
3.2.0.1 Import Address Table Based
Similarity: The Import Address Table keeps
track of the DLL’s that are imported during the
runtime of the program [14]. Imports of DLL’s
are not commonly obfuscated (unlike the ability
to reorder instructions or obfuscate the data
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section), so these are more likely to be left in
place.
3.2.0.2 Dynamic API Call Based Similarity: Dynamic sequences analysis compare
sections of code, instead of individual instructions. For example, during the run time of a
program, checking for the API calls made and
analyzing the log to see what IP addresses are
accessed. This method works relatively well, as
even if the malware is encrypted, the performance will still show what happens.
3.2.1 Construction of a Similarity Function
When working through the previous section, the sample size was relatively small, and
so the program could compare all malware
samples to all other malware samples. However, this is an O(n2 ) runtime. In order to scale
this comparison algorithm to a larger number
of malware binaries, we have to cut the runtime somehow to be able to make it usable.
Therefore, we can only do a) random selections
of malware samples or b) selected pairs of
malware samples. Random selection is faster,
but could theoretically result in a bunch of useless comparisons. However, modules from the
scikit library in python can handle selecting
random subsets with minimal bias.

4 C ONSTRUCTION
N EURAL N ETWORK
TION OF M ALWARE

OF A
FOR

S UPERVISED
THE D ETEC -

The techniques discussed thus far are all different methods of identifying malware. However, it is difficult to manually assign a
”weight” to each item. This is where a neural
network comes into play. For this project, the
python library sklearn will be used to create a
supervised neural network 5 . A neural network
at its core consists of a few high level steps.
5. The two classes of neural networks with regards to training
type are supervised and unsupervised. A supervised neural
network requires that training data already be pre-classified
(in this case, the sample binaries are pre-sorted into malware
and benignware). On the other hand, an unsupervised neural
network does not require the data to be pre-classified. This type
of neural network is far more complex to design; however, it
tends to be more useful in the real world when a pre-classified
set of training data might not necessarily be available.[8]

These steps will be introduced here, then described in more detail individually.
4.1 High Level steps of a Supervised Neural Network
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Preprocess data
Select a random subset of data for training.
Train the neural network on the training data subset.
Extract features from training data
Test the neural network on the testing
data subset.

4.2 Explanations of the steps of a supervised Neural Network
A more in depth explanation of these steps
follows, along with explanations of how they
are implemented in the project.
1)

Preprocess data
In the world of data analysis, a common saying is ”garbage in, garbage
out”. This applies heavily to the field of
machine learning. If useless data is input, then the resulting model will also
be useless. Therefore, preprocessing of
the data is critical.
Good data should have all of the following characterstics:
•
•

•

Accurate Data.
Properly labeled data. All of the
data in the world is useless if the
columns are not labeled.
Unbiased data. If data is only
presented from a specific circumstance, or heavily leans towards
one side of the classifications,
then the algorithm will learn and
be biased towards that data [17].
6

•

Large quantities of data. A machine learning algorithm requires

6. One instance of this causing issues in the technical world is
mammogram images for cancer detection. Because the training
data primarily comes from white women, it is not as applicable
for women of color, and therefore is biased data.[6]
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massive amounts of data to begin to form accurate guesses.
Reusing data will result in bias.
To properly preprocess the data, the
following steps are done:
a)
b)

2)

Split the data into benignware
and malware.
Eliminate the data points that
are not relevant to the training of the algorithm. For this
project, irrelevant data points
are the file name, the md5 hash,
and the malware/benignware
flag. The name and md5 hash
are not important for the training of the algorithm. The malware/benignware flag will be
important later, but is not something that should be taken into
account during the training of
the algorithm7 .

See appendix C.3 for a description of
the data used in this project.
Select a random subset of data for training.
Just as selecting the master pool of data
must be done carefully, one must select
a subset of data that is random and
likely to be a good representation of
the data that the program will analyze. In the case of this project, if all
of the data selected for training was
benignware, then the algorithm would
not be able to learn how to detect malware, and vice versa. There are many
libraries for python that can randomly
select data points for training. The
library sklearn.model_selection
takes care of this work. The data
should be split into its classifications
(in this case, split into known malware and known benignware). This indication should be stored somewhere
with the individual data point. For this

7. To clarify, this flag is critical for testing, but should not be
used for training. Otherwise, the classifier could theoretically
just use the flag to generate a perfect solution, but this would
not be useful as soon as the model is to be applied to real-world
data, where the malicious intent of a program is unknown.

3)

4)

5)

project, there will be four clusters of
data: Training Malware, Training Benignware, Testing Malware, Testing Benignware.
For
this
project,
the
module
train_test_split was used. This
takes the filtered input data (with all
irrelevant features dropped), and splits
it into the four categories indicated
above.
Train the neural network on the training
data subset.
This is the core part of the neural network. For this project, a Random Forest
Classifier (RFC) was used. This is a prebuilt supervised learning method in the
python scikit library. An RFC uses randomly generated decision trees based
on randomly generated subsets of data.
It then scores each decision tree and selects the best one via a ”majority vote”.
See appendix C.4 for a graphic showing
this in more detail. This generates an
ExtraTreeesClassifier object. An
important thing to note from this is that
the RFC uses random number generation to create the trees. This means
that each time the program is run, a
different decision tree will be created.
Extract features from training data
Using the scikit meta-transformer
SelectFromModel, one can find
the most important features used in
creating the decision tree generated by
the random forest classifier. According
to the scikit documentation [15],
this is a ”Meta-transformer for
selecting features based on importance
weights.”. See appendix C.5 for an
example of output weights.
Test the neural network on the testing data
subset.
After the neural network has been
trained, it is critical to test the network
on the remaining data set. It is critical
not to use the training data as testing
data, as this can result in an artificially
high accuracy rate.
With the testing data, the neural net-
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work should be run and the accuracy
rates analyzed. There are a few possible
outcomes from this analysis.
•

•

•

Low training accuracy. This results from poor or unfiltered
data being used for training. One
should analyze the raw data and
determine if relevant aspects are
being used as data points.
High training accuracy, low testing accuracy: The model has been
overfit. A larger percentage of
data should be devoted to the
training data, or the training data
used was not a good representation of the data.
High training accuracy, high testing accuracy: This is a good fit of
a model. This means that the testing data was well-filtered and a
good representation of the overal
data.

At this point, the neural network has been
created and tested. Using a library such as
python’s pickle library. this algorithm can
be converted to serialized data and saved for
future runs of the program. Furthermore, one
can run large numbers of iterations and compare the accuracy/precision levels, and save the
algorithm that results in the best performance.

5

E VALUATION OF
TECTION S YSTEM

A

•

•

•

Accuracy Rate
99.5%
False Positive Rate
0.52%
False Negative Rate 0.48%
Training Time
10 sec
TABLE 1
Training and runtime results from an average of several
hundred runs of the neural network.

M ALWARE D E -

Detection rate is a very simple idea that can
be extremely difficult to put into practice. There
are four possible outcomes for an unknown
piece of code. In this table, ”positive result”
means the code is determined to be malware.
•

In machine learning, one can classify these
features in a table known as a Confusion Matrix. The documentation for sklearn defines a
confusion matrix:
”By definition a confusion matrix C is such
that Ci,j is equal to the number of observations
known to be in group i and predicted to be in
group j .”
A theoretically perfect system will only output true positives. However, no malware detection system is perfect. A system must be
determined to evaluate the detection level of
the malware detection system.
At first, one may consider just using the true
of True Positives
positive rate of detection, or Number
Number of Malware .
However, a trivial system could score a 100%
score with this algorithm, by simply identifying
every system as malware, regardless of if it is
malware or benignware. Therefore, a system
also needs to test the false positive rate, or the
rate at which the system determines benignware to be malware.
On the other hand, false negatives are extremely harmful to a malware detection system.
If the false negative rate is high, then malware
will be identified as benignware and sneak past
evasion. This is the worst possible scenario.
With the neural network trained for this
project, the following accuracy was obtained:

Malicious Code, Positive result: True
Positive
Non-Malicious Code, Positive result:
False Positive
Malicious Code, Negative result: False
Negative
Non-Malicious Code, Negative result:
True Negative

6

C ONCLUSION

This project showed how a neural network
could be created to guess as to the malicious intent of a program given certain pre-determined
values given from analysis of the executable.
This relied on 53 data points for each malware sample. With the use of a Random Forest
Classifier on about twenty thousand training
data points, a neural network with an accuracy
level of about 99% with a false positive and
false negative accuracy of sub 1% level was

8

trained in about 10 seconds, as shown in table
1. With a larger set of data points, a wider
range of malware samples, and more powerful
hardware (such as training with a GPU cluster),
a far more powerful algorithm could be trained.
The next step on this project would be
extending it for the use of learning directly
from the executable files, instead of from preextracted data. For simplicity’s sake, I chose
to use pre-extracted data points from the files.
However, with the use of libraries such as
python’s pefile library, one would be able to
extract data from malware files that could then
be used to create the data file with which the
neural network is trained.

9

A PPENDIX A
A NALYSIS ON IRC B OT

A.1

Static Analysis on IRC Bot

One of the most basic and commonly used analysis methods of malware is doing a string
dump. In this case, using the strings command on a portable executable file results in the
output of all strings of printable characters of length 4 or greater. The 4 is the default.
When combing through a large executable such as this, it can help to increase the length of
the minimum string, which helps filter out some of the false positive results.
With some trial and error, I figured that 15 characters was a decent start. This output is
truncated for readability. In particular, the lines of notice are the formatting strings used for
printing.
$ s t r i n g s −n15 i r c b o t . exe
...
[CAPTURE ] : Webcam c a p t u r e saved t o : %s .
[CAPTURE ] : Driver l i s t complete .
[CAPTURE ] : Driver #%d − %s − %s .
[CAPTURE ] : No f i l e n a m e s p e c i f i e d f o r s c r e e n c a p t u r e .
[CAPTURE ] : E r r o r while c a p t u r i n g s c r e e n .
[CAPTURE ] : Screen c a p t u r e saved t o : %s .
[KEYLOG ] : No key l o g g e r t h r e a d found .
[KEYLOG ] : Key l o g g e r stopped . (%d t h r e a d ( s ) stopped . )
[KEYLOG ] : F a i l e d t o s t a r t l o g g i n g thread , e r r o r : <%d > .
...
$
Of particular interest are the ones about the keylogger. Therefore, we can suspect that this
program has a keylogger in it, and our analysis should focus on finding keyloggers.

A.2

Advanced Static Analysis on IRC Bot

To take it farther than a basic string dump, I found the tool Binary Ninja 8 . After creating a
free account, I uploaded the IRC bot executable and ran an analysis.
This took approximately a minute to run, and then returned multiple pages of results.
The first result is the disassembled program.

8. found on cloud.binary.ninja
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Fig. 1. The reverse engineered assembly of the IRC bot. This is just one of the many functions found in the binary. By going through
each of the functions, one can get a general idea of what the function does. However, this takes a lot of time, as even a simple for
loop in assembly takes several lines of code.

11

The next result is the string dump. This screenshot is eliminated for space saving purposes, as
the relevant portion of the string dump is shown in the previous appendix.
The next result is the ”types”. This is an estimation of the various data structures that appear
in the program. A few selected structures are shown here:
s t r u c t Import Directory Table
{
00000000 u i n t 3 2 t importLookupTableRva ;
00000004 u i n t 3 2 t timeDateStamp ;
00000008 u i n t 3 2 t forwarderChain ;
0000000 c u i n t 3 2 t nameRva ;
00000010 u i n t 3 2 t importAddressTableRva ;
};

s t r u c t LARGE INTEGER
{
00000000
DWORD LowPart ;
00000004
LONG HighPart ;
};

s t r u c t OVERLAPPED
{
00000000
ULONG PTR I n t e r n a l ;
00000004
ULONG PTR I n t e r n a l H i g h ;
00000008
union u ;
00000010
HANDLE hEvent ;
};

This page did not yield as much useful information for a basic static analysis, at least at the
level of analysis I am doing. However, this could be useful in comparing this program to other
malware.
There is then a linear disassembly, which attempts to reverse engineer to a high level source
code.

Fig. 2. This is an attempt to reverse engineer the binary executable to its original source code. However, as this code is automatically
generated, the code may not be obvious at first as to what it does. This can be due to many reasons, but the two most common
reasons are compiler optimization and malicious obfuscation.
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A PPENDIX B
A N ETWORK

OF

M ALWARE S AMPLES

The network of malware allows one to see groups of attack campaigns. If a group of malware
all share common traits, then they will have an edge connecting them. As can be seen here, there
are four or five major groupings of malware. What actually makes them similar is not known
from this graph, but one can see that they are grouped.

Fig. 3. This graph shows the common connections between a listing of 46 different types of malware.

The Python script that generated this graph first analyzed each of the malware for different
features. Then, it calculated the similarity score between different samples using a program called
minihash. Finally, it generated a .dot file containing the information shown in the graph.
The graph was generated with graphx, a python library for the visual depiction of graphs.

A PPENDIX C
E XPLANATIONS
C.1

OF

P RINCIPLES

AND

C ONCEPTS

A Demonstration of Compiler Optimization

Most modern compilers have an option to enable compiler optimizations. For the standard
Linux C compiler, gcc, this can be enabled with the -O flag. Default is minimal optimization.

13

According to the gcc docs, the compiler will not do any optimizations that would increase
executable size or compilation time significantly. This means the compiler attempts to directly
translate source code to machine code, with a minimum amount of optimization. Using the -O0
flag will enable some basic optimizations.
Changing the flag to -O1 or O2 lets the compiler attempt to optimize the output for speed,
such as inlining functions, pre-calculating values, or moving loop invariants. Changing this to
-O3 or -Ofast means the compiler will do whatever it can to speed up the program, as long as it
does not change the output of the program. However, floating point calculations may be slightly
reduced in accuracy for a speedup during runtime.
For an example, the following is a basic C program that adds two numbers.
i n t main ( ) {
int a = 1111;
int b = 2560;
int c = a + b ;
return c ;
}
Compiled with no optimization (gcc -S file.c)
main :
. LFB0 :
. cfi startproc
pushq
%rbp
. c f i d e f c f a o f f s e t 16
. c f i o f f s e t 6 , −16
movq
%rsp , %rbp
. cfi def cfa register 6
movl
$1111 , −12(%rbp )
movl
$2560 , −8(%rbp )
movl
−12(%rbp ) , %edx
movl
−8(%rbp ) , %eax
addl
%edx , %eax
movl
%eax , −4(%rbp )
movl
−4(%rbp ) , %eax
popq
%rbp
. cfi def cfa 7 , 8
ret
. cfi endproc
For such a simple program, this takes a large number of steps to calculate a fixed result.
However, this is what no optimizing does. The compiler takes each command in the source code,
and writes the corresponding assembly commands. This is where the optimizer comes in.
Compiled with gcc -S file.c -0fast
main :
. LFB0 :
. cfi startproc
movl
$3671 , %eax
ret
. cfi endproc
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The majority of the program disappeared into one line. The compiler optimized out the
addition during runtime, and instead did the calculation during compile time. This eliminated
the instantiation of 3 different variables, as well as a calculation.
This is a very simple example, but it shows how the same source code can look drastically
different with a different compiler flag. Even more drastic would be the use of a different compiler
(say, if cmake had been used instead of gcc, the output and optimizations would have been
totally different).
C.2 Portable Executable Files
The Portable Executable File Format is a layout for executables in 32 and 64 bit versions
of Microsoft Windows operating systems. This format consists of multiple sections, each with
varying memory protections. Some of these sections are the .text, .rdata, .data, and .rsrc
sections.

Fig. 4. This image shows the general layout of a portable executable file. [1]

The .text section contains the entry point of .main at its beginning, as well as the program
code. This section is marked as read-only and executable. The reasoning for read-only code is
to prevent the construction of self-modifying programs, which used to be a common way of
disguising the true intent of a program.
The .rdata section is a read-only section which contains information such as hard-coded
strings. Because strings are immutable, they are stored in a read-only/noexecute section of
memory when the program is executed. This is to prevent malicious users from executing userdefined code in the runtime of the program.
The .data section contains the global data that can be accessed from anywhere in the
program.
The .rsrc section contains resources such as icons, images, and menus used by the program.
Another part of a PE file is the Import Address Table. The IAT is one of the features that the
neural network in this project uses to guess the maliciousness of a program. An IAT is a table
consisting of the required external libraries to be linked during runtime, as well as their address
where they can be loaded from.
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C.3

Data points used for analysis

The data used for this project relied on 56 data points for each of 138,048 executables. The
data points consisted of the following. Bolded terms indicate items that were included in the
original data set but were excluded for training purposes. These items were excluded due to their
irrelevance to determining whether or not a program was considered malware.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

C.4

•
Name
•
md5
•
Machine
•
SizeOfOptionalHeader
•
Characteristics
•
MajorLinkerVersion
•
MinorLinkerVersion
•
SizeOfCode
•
SizeOfInitializedData
•
SizeOfUninitializedData
•
AddressOfEntryPoint
•
BaseOfCode
•
BaseOfData
•
ImageBase
•
SectionAlignment
•
FileAlignment
•
MajorOperatingSystemVersion
•
MinorOperatingSystemVersion
•
MajorImageVersion

MinorImageVersion
MajorSubsystemVersion
MinorSubsystemVersion
SizeOfImage
SizeOfHeaders
CheckSum
Subsystem
DllCharacteristics
SizeOfStackReserve
SizeOfStackCommit
SizeOfHeapReserve
SizeOfHeapCommit
LoaderFlags
NumberOfRvaAndSizes
SectionsNb
SectionsMeanEntropy
SectionsMinEntropy
SectionsMaxEntropy
SectionsMeanRawsize

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

SectionsMinRawsize
SectionMaxRawsize
SectionsMeanVirtualsize
SectionsMinVirtualsize
SectionMaxVirtualsize
ImportsNbDLL
ImportsNb
ImportsNbOrdinal
ExportNb
ResourcesNb
ResourcesMeanEntropy
ResourcesMinEntropy
ResourcesMaxEntropy
ResourcesMeanSize
ResourcesMinSize
ResourcesMaxSize
LoadConfigurationSize
VersionInformationSize
legitimate

A graphic representation of a Random Forest Classifier

Fig. 5. This image shows the general outline of a random forest classifier. Each of the decision trees generated from the data set
are scored on how well they predict outcomes, and then the ”best” one is the one used by the algorithm. [12]
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C.5

Weights Generated from an Instance of the Random Forest Classifier

Because a Random Forest Classifier (by nature of its name) operates based off the results of
a random number generation, each run of the generation of the classifier will result in slightly
different values. This is an example of the output from one such run of the program.
14 p o i n t s a r e c o n s i d e r e d important
1 Machine
2 DllCharacteristics
3 Characteristics
4 SectionsMaxEntropy
5 Subsystem
6 ImageBase
7 VersionInformationSize
8 ResourcesMinEntropy
9 ResourcesMaxEntropy
10 MajorSubsystemVersion
11 S i z e O f S t a c k R e s e r v e
12 SizeOfOptionalHeader
13 SectionsMinEntropy
14 MajorOperatingSystemVersion

D

0.1387
0.1185
0.1055
0.0682
0.0651
0.0618
0.0551
0.0462
0.0376
0.0371
0.0274
0.0264
0.0225
0.0199

A FTERWORD

This project was my first real deep dive into machine learning for malware analysis. I had
previously done some basic level neural networks, but it was interesting to see the applications
for malware.
I look forward to learning more about this as I go into the professional world and continue to
apply the knowledge I have learned from this project.
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